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Abstract
The weekly release of the U.S. inventory level by the DOE-EIA is known as the market mover in
the U.S. oil futures market and to be a significant piece of information for all world oil markets in
which the WTI is a price benchmark. We uncover suspicious trading patterns in the WTI futures
markets in days when the inventory level is released that are higher than economists’ forecasts:
there are significantly more orders initiated by buyers in the two hours preceding the official release of the inventory level. We also show a clear drop in the average price of -0.25% ahead of the
news release. This is consistent with informed trading. We also provide evidence of an asymmetric response of the oil price to the news, and highlight an over-reaction that is partly compensated
in the hours following the announcement.

JEL Classification: G13, G14, Q4.
Keywords: insider trading, WTI crude oil futures, intraday data, inventory release.
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Introduction

This paper provides evidence of suspicious trading patterns consistent with informed trading in the
WTI oil-futures market on the days when the announcement of the U.S. crude oil stock level by the
Department of Energy contrasts with the expectations of energy analysts collected in Bloomberg’s
inventory survey. Our results reveal significant order imbalance, with a majority of buyer-initiated
trades in the two hours preceding the announcement of positive surprises – changes in inventories
that are larger than expected – at 10:30 a.m. on Wednesday.1 The findings are robust to alternative
definitions of the surprise and the measures of order imbalance considered. Our results have important implications, as the WTI futures market is the leading market with respect to price discovery (see the recent evidence in Elder et al. (2014)) and the most-traded futures commodity contract
worldwide.
The inventory level is known to be a central variable for the determination of oil prices, as highlighted in early theoretical contributions such as Deaton and Laroque (1996), Pindyck (1994, 2001),
Geman and Nguyen (2005), Pirrong (2009) or more recently Kilian and Murphy (2013), Kilian and
Lee (2014), Smith et al. (2015) and Knittel and Pindyck (2016). As noted in Kilian and Murphy
(2013): "[...] any expectation of a shortfall of future oil supply relative to future oil demand not
already captured by flow demand and flow supply shocks necessarily causes an increase in the demand for above-ground oil inventories and hence in the real price of oil." (p. 455) Inventories may
also be related to precautionary demand, as highlighted in Alquist and Kilian (2010) and Hamilton
(2009a).2 In a world of scarcity of fossil fuels, the role of inventories might well be exacerbated (see
Hamilton (2009b)).
It is hence not surprising that weekly announcements about the level of oil stocks in the U.S. are
1 All times in the paper are eastern standard times (EST).
2 Hamilton

points out that: "One might also try to measure the contribution of precautionary demand by looking at changes

in inventories. [...] inventories were going down, not up, at the time of the sharpest price movements, suggesting that
inventory changes were serving to mitigate rather than aggravate the price shocks. Positive inventory investment typically
came much later, as firms sought to restock inventories that had been earlier drawn down." (p. 223)
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eagerly anticipated by the financial community3 and their absence – for instance in the case of
the 2013 government shutdown – can be viewed as "darkness" for traders.4 As shown in recent
research, changes in inventory levels can have a significant impact on oil prices, as in Bjursell et
al. (2015) and Elder et al. (2013).5 Going beyond the oil market, it is well-known that the release
of the oil-inventory level each week affects the volatility of the stock index.6 This is to be expected
in the light of the empirical results in Jones and Kaul (1996) and Kilian and Park (2008), who both
show how oil price shocks spread into the stock market. The release of inventory level might also
affect the currencies of oil-exporting countries, as the oil price has been shown to be a predictor of
exchange rates in these countries (Ferraro et al. (2015), Zhang et al. (2016)).
This impact of the EIA announcement release on oil prices is illustrated in Figure 1, where we plot
the transaction prices over the day of July 16th 2008. The Bloomberg median forecast for this day
was a drop of 2.2 million barrels, with individual forecasts by oil experts going up to -3.9 million
barrels. The actual reported value was instead a rise in stocks of 2.952 million barrels, which greatly
surprised the market and led to a drop in price of almost 6 dollars in the few minutes following the
release at 10:35 a.m.
Apart from inventory announcements, there has been substantial research on the impact of nonoil-specific news on oil prices. For instance, Barnhart (1989) is an early attempt to assess the reaction of commodity prices to macroeconomic announcements. Using daily data, Kilian and Vega
(2011) find no evidence of an impact of macro news on oil prices. This has important implications for the exogeneity of oil prices and its and its ordering in multivariate models such as vectorautoregressive models when the impact of shocks is investigated. Chatrath et al. (2012) confirm
these findings using intraday data. Rosa (2014) and Basistha and Kurov (2015) analyze the impact
of monetary surprises on oil prices using intraday data. As such, they can identify the effect of
3 Wall Street Journal (2015).
4 Bloomberg (2013).
5 Similar

evidence for the gas market appears in Chiou-Wei et al. (2014). In a related study, Linn and Zhu (2002) onsider the

volatility surrounding the release of the gas-storage report.
6 Wall Street Journal Online (2015).
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Figure 1
The oil price on July 16th 2008. The oil-inventory announcement was higher than expected.

surprises at the exact time when they occur. Datta et al. (2014) provide evidence that events of
various types can significantly affect on the conditional distribution of returns measured by the
option-implied density. Berk and Rauch (2016) investigate the impact of CFTC announcements on
oil prices.
It is well-known, however, that the largest impact on oil prices comes from the inventory announcement, which is the most anticipated piece of news in the oil market. Recent research has thus focused on the impact of this release of the stock level. Bu (2014) is one attempt to assess the impact of
inventory announcements on both oil prices and oil volatility. This work, however, uses daily data,
a frequency at which the phenomena taking place over a few minutes might well not be visible.
Halova Wolfe and Rosenman (2014) also consider the impact of the oil-inventory announcement
on both oil and gas prices and volatility. They use intraday data, but focus on the specific time of
announcements, thereby ignoring the periods around the time of the release. Bjursell et al. (2015)
also make use of intraday data to investigate the association between inventory announcements
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and price jumps, and provide evidence that these, mainly large jumps, often appear at the time
of the stock announcement. Elder et al. (2013) also use intraday data to detect intraday jumps
in oil prices. The authors provide evidence that jumps often coincide with the release of either
macro-news or oil-specific news (inventories), showing the importance of fundamentals in the determination of oil prices beyond speculative motivations.7 Finally, Ye and Karali (2016) consider
the informational content of inventory announcements, looking at both EIA and API releases over
the short August 2012 - December 2013 time period. They find no significant, or at best a weakly
significant, price impact of the API is and that the market mover for oil is indeed the EIA release.
In contrast to our study, the authors only focus on the impact of the news and not on potentially
suspicious trading patterns before the official release time.8
Our work takes a different approach, building on recent contributions by Irvine et al. (2007), Christophe
et al. (2010), Blau and Wade (2012) and Bernile et al. (2016), where the focus is on the detection of
information leakage before official announcements.9 In contrast with previous work such as Ederington and Lee (1995), these papers go beyond the simple analysis of return patterns to assess the
possibility of leakage by taking into account order imbalance as a symptom of informed trading.
We also base our analysis on order imbalance to draw conclusions about the likelihood that market
participants trade on private information.
The impact of the arrival of information on stock returns is a fundamental and recurrent question in financial economics. Under the strong form hypothesis of the Efficient-Market-Hypothesis
7 Hamilton

(2009a and b), Büyükşahin and Harris (2011), Alquist and Gervais (2013), Singleton (2014), Knittel and Pindyck

(2016) and Bunn et al. (2017) are examples of contributions discussing the relationship between oil prices and speculation.
As noted in Fattouh et al. (2013), the conclusions from these analyses of commodity financiarisation are mixed and do not
support the view that speculation unambiguously causes oil prices.
is similar work using intraday data for non-energy commodities such as corn (Lehecka et al. (2014)). The focus is

8 There

again on the price reaction to scheduled announcements, while we look at both the price and the trading pattern in the
pre-announcement period.
9 Information leakage has been investigated in various contexts, such as credit derivatives (Acharya and Johnson (2007)),
sovereign-debt ranking (Michaelides et al. (2015)), tender offers (Jarrell and Poulsen (1989)), SEC filings (Rogers et al. (2016))
and supervised industries (Reeb et al. (2014)). Paradoxically, the last paper shows that information flows to the regulator
lead to greater levels of insider trading.
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(EMH), it is not possible for even an insider to outperform the market portfolio. Under the semistrong form hypothesis, which is more plausible, a trader may benefit from private information
if this latter produces a valuation that is different enough from market expectations for the asset
of interest. The extensive literature on the EMH following Fama (1970) has recently been reinvigorated by the availability of very high-frequency trading data and the possibility of relating news
to intraday returns. Early attempts such as Ederington and Lee (1993, 1995) found that the price
changes following news releases are often completed in the first seconds after the announcement.
Many other contributions followed that have helped to enhance our understanding of how prices
incorporate information.10
Our paper is the first to focus on the possibility of information leakage before the inventory announcements, and to show that the trading patterns are consistent with informed trading. We
specifically examine the trading activity around the weekly inventory announcements in the frontmonth WTI oil-futures contract traded on the NYMEX-CME over the 2007-2014 period. The U.S.
Department of Energy makes an announcement about the level of oil inventories each Wednesday
at 10:30. We investigate potential trading by informed investors in the hours preceding the official news release. We use intraday data to calculate the order imbalance over short intervals (2 or 5
minutes) and show that there is significant order imbalance in days when the news release contains
surprising inventory-level information. This pertains when the actual stock level is higher than expected (a positive surprise). The bulk of the order imbalance occurs around the beginning of the
open outcry trading session when liquidity is sufficiently high.
Our results can be taken as providing preliminary evidence that the inventory level released by the
DOE each Wednesday is known by some market participants who are able to benefit from their
insider position to make money with the news. More generally, our results call into question the
overall informational efficiency of the most liquid commodity market in the world. We should,
10 Well-known references in this area include Andersen et al.

(2003), Vega (2006) or Lucca and Moench (2015).
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nevertheless, be careful in interpreting these findings. While our results are consistent with the
presence of informed trading, they do not explicitly demonstrate it. In particular, some traders
may have superior ability in either predicting the inventory level to be released and/or in analyzing
the ongoing information flow about oil supply and demand conditions.11
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the issue of insider trading
in the specific case of commodity markets. Section 3 presents the price and inventory data and
provides preliminary evidence of the diffusion of private information on the oil price before the
official release time. Section 4 is then devoted to the empirical analysis, where order-imbalances
are formally related to surprises. The last section concludes and discusses the implication of our
findings, as well as avenues for future research.

2

Insider trading in commodity markets

Grossman (1986) theoretically discusses the potential interest of insider trading in futures markets.
On the one hand, insider trading can be liquidity-enhancing but can also, on the other, reduce
liquidity and markedly affect the viability of futures markets. Leland (1992) corroborates these effects, adding that insider trading does help to integrate information into prices. Outside investors,
nevertheless, can lose significantly. John and Lang (1991), building on early work by Pettit (1972),
analyze the impact of earnings announcements in the stock market.12 More recently, Hirshleifer
et al. (1994) and Brunnermeier (2005) have developed theories of the utilization of private information in trading. and conclude that short-lived informational advantages can lead to significant
profits for insiders.
These high and unfair potential profits are naturally a source of concern for regulators. Indeed, "in11 Some

traders may benefit from better due diligence, which is now very sophisticated. For instance, Verstein (2016) reports

the use of helicopters with infrared cameras flying around storage facilities in Oklahoma in order to estimate oil reserves.
12 Earnings are, of course, one of the most important items of news for individual stock prices, and have been the subject of
intense research in financial economics in recent years.
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sider trading" is generally regarded as an illegal activity. However, this term covers both illegal and
legal trading activities, depending on the nature of the market (equities, commodities) and regional
trading rules. In equity markets, legal insider trading refers to corporate insiders (officers, directors
or employees) trading their own securities within the boundaries of company policy and regulations governing overall trading. For instance in the U.S., corporate insiders must report their trades
to the SEC. Insider trading in equity markets is broadly prohibited in all countries with stock markets. Insider-trading laws were first established in the United States (1934), then in France (1967)
and finally appeared much later in some developed countries such as Germany (1994).13
In commodity-futures markets, the illegal nature of insider trading is less obvious than in equity
markets. It is clear that having private information can give a trader an unfair advantage in commodity futures markets. If the trader hears about an important event before the public, he holds a
short-lived information advantage from which he can possibly profit by for instance selling short
in the hope of buying more cheaply later. But it is not because this is unfair that it is illegal. Actually, insider trading using misappropriated governmental information remained legal until 2010,
and insider trading on information obtained outside of the government is still allowed on commodity futures markets. The reason for the latter is that futures markets are hedging markets: their
purpose is to protect buyers and sellers from unexpected price movements which represent commercial risk. As hedging decisions are linked to commercial positions that potentially affect commodity prices, it seems difficult to prohibit insider trading on information obtained outside of the
government. In other words, the commercial risks depend on material information that hedgers
hold. As such, the prohibition of insider trading would be in opposition to the essential nature of
commodity futures markets.
This difference between securities and commodity futures probably explains why the U.S. only recently banned insider trading using non-public information from government sources in commod13 See

Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) for a survey of insider-trading law enactment and their different enforcement across

the world. See also Bhattacharya (2014) for a general discussion of insider trading in equity market.
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ity futures market, with the approval of the U.S. Financial Reform Law in July 2010.14 This post-2008
reform includes a section dealing with insider trading using data on commodities that practitioners
used to coin the "Eddie Murphy rule".15 This section of the 2010 Financial Reform Law illustrates
the effort to standardize CFTC and SEC rules, but received a cold reception from commodity traders
for two main reasons. First, they were concerned that the wording of the Law would prevent them
from trading on their own information that they had previously reported to the government (USDA,
DOE and CFTC) and which was not yet released. Second, they fear that government analysts would
be prevented from answering questions from private-sector analysts and traders. Due to the nature
of commodity futures markets, the proposed legislative text has been tweaked in order to prevent
curbs on information exchange.
Despite there being no historical evidence of USDA or DOE leaks in recent decades, the "Eddie
Murphy" rule serves the market and public by protecting market participants and promoting market integrity. There have, however, been past experiences of insider-trading scandals in commodity
markets. The most notable one dates back to 1905 and involved a trader and a USDA statistician.
Since this scandal, weekly and monthly report preparation has been increasingly secured by the
USDA: locked doors, closed window shades, armed guards, and criminal penalties for staff who
leak. The EIA has also adopted increasingly strict procedures since the last mistake of May 29th
2008. At that time, the oil price was $130 a barrel and the EIA briefly released its weekly inventory
report online before the scheduled time. Warned by web robots, informed traders profited from
this mistake and the data quickly spread via instant messages. The EIA website was recording 5,000
hints a second around the time of the report release. In the end, no traders were punished as this
was a mistake by the EIA.
According to some analysts, the probability of information leakage from government offices such
14 This Financial Reform Law is over 2,000 pages long and represents a sweeping attempt to prevent future financial crises.
15 This refers to the film “Trading Places” where two commodity brokers, Eddie Murphy and Dan Aykroyd, make a profit on the

frozen orange juice market using a stolen orange crop report from the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA).
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like the USDA or the DOE is extremely slim (Futures Magazine, 2010). However, knowing that some
Fed officials were recently concerned by the suspicious use of insider information (Wall Street Journal, 2016), information leakage from the DOE remains, in the light of our results, a credible phenomenon.

3

Data and preliminary data analysis

Our empirical analysis requires two types of data: information on inventory announcements and
market expectations, and then oil-futures prices at high-frequency. Our choice of the January 2007 –
October 2014 period is dictated by the electronic trading in Globex from July 2006 onwards, thereby
making the nature of the market very different from this date. We thus decided to exclude the period
before January 2007.

3.1

Inventory announcements, expectations and surprises

Information on the inventory level is generally released each Wednesday at 10:30 a.m., except when
the Wednesday corresponds to a holiday – in which case the announcement is made on the Thursday or possibly the Friday. The release is made by the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA),
which is the statistical and analytical agency within the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). This
weekly announcement is coined the "Weekly Petroleum Status Report" (WPSR), and includes many
figures relating to the oil market such as field production, imports and exports, inputs and production at refineries and blending terminals, production from gas-processing plants and fractionators,
and inventories at refineries, terminals, pipelines, and fractionators. The report covers the 50 States
and the District of Columbia.16 We here only consider the change in the total petroleum stocks for
the U.S., excluding Strategic Petroleum Reserves. This change in stocks is calculated using com16 Further

information

about

the

full

content

of

the

http://www.eia.gov/petroleum/supply/weekly/pdf/wpsrall.pdf.
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WPSR

can

be

found

on

the

EIA

website

at:

Table 1
Summary statistics of U.S. oil inventory actual values and analysts’ forecast errors

N

Mean*

Std dev.*

Median*

Min*

Max*

Actual values

402

124.97

3846.58

466.50

-11120.00

10013.00

Median estimates

402

241.73

1740.00

750.00

-4950.00

3200.00

Forecasting errors

402

-116.76

3255.74

94.50

-10120.00

9033.00

Absolute forecasting errors

402

2533.28

2048.39

1990.50

11.00

10120.00

* Thousands bbl.
The table reports sample statistics of oil inventories for the period between February 7th 2007 and October 22nd 2014.
"Actual values" refer to the EIA actual oil inventory data, "Median estimates" are the median forecasts from the weekly
Bloomberg survey, "Forecasting errors" are the difference between the actual value and the median forecast of each weekly
oil inventory, and "Abs forecasting errors" are the absolute value of this difference.

pany submissions for the week ending at 7:00 a.m. the preceding Friday.
It is important to note here that the EIA does not pre-release/embargo this data to any outside
entities.17 As such, our case similar is different from that in Bernile et al. (2016), where Federal
Open Market Committee (FOMC) scheduled announcements are pre-released to media companies
for analysis before public release. Our investigation then covers a longer period – several hours –
before the announcement and is not confined to any predetermined period.
We define surprises using the weekly Bloomberg’s survey that is conducted with the participation of
a dozen experts in the oil industry. For the period February 7th 2007 to October 22nd 2014, we have
data on 402 announcements with a mean number of experts of 13.14. The minimum and maximum
number of experts is 8 and 19, respectively, making the calculation of statistical values feasible.
Over our study period, 55 analysts representing 49 firms that are invested in oil trading delivered
forecasts. We also collect the exact time release, the date and individual forecasts from experts from
the Bloomberg database.18 This allows us to measure the gap between the prediction and the actual
17 We

thanks employees at the EIA for confirming this point. Our results about price and trading patterns before announce-

ments are then not the product of possible leakage due to pre-release.
18 In a few instances, the release is made at 10:35 a.m. or 11:00 a.m. We take this into account in our analysis and analyze price
and trading relative to the announcement time. In some Figures, we report time rather than time relative to news release for
clarity. The reader should be aware that in the case of delayed announcement, the reported time is not exact.
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value, and thus whether to classify an announcement as a surprise. Table 1 reports the summary
statistics for the actual values, forecasts and forecast errors. As can be seen, the forecast is, on
average, slightly optimistic and the variability of realized values and forecasting errors is large.
We rely on these survey forecasts, as there is no traded instrument that would allow us to infer
market expectations (as in the case of interest rate futures for FOMC meetings). In our baseline
analysis, we define a surprise as an actual value that is over three standard deviations from the
median forecast in the Bloomberg survey: we call these 3σ surprises.19 At the end of the empirical
section, we show that our results are robust to alternative definitions of surprises.
Table 2 shows the summary statistics for surprises. In the total sample of 402 announcements over
the February 2007 – October 2014 period, there are 90 surprises (22.39%), of which 43 are positive
and 47 are negative. This is sufficient to carry out a statistical analysis of surprises. The number of
yearly surprises in Table 2 is quite stable, as is the ratio of yearly positive to negative surprises. Each
year, there are 3 to 8 positive or negative surprises. We also do not see any particular trend over the
sample, with surprises not being clustered in particular years. To further examine the occurrence of
surprises, Figures 2 and 3 respectively plot the number of surprises and the number of positive vs.
negative surprises by week number. Again, there is no particular pattern: surprises do not appear in
certain periods of the year, and neither do positive or negative surprises. We thus conclude that the
econometric analysis does not need to consider year or week effects, or any seasonal correction,
to take into account particular time patterns in surprises, despite the well-known seasonality in
inventory levels over the year.
An alternative to the EIA release is the inventory news reported by API every Tuesday afternoon at
4:30 p.m.20 The API announcement takes place before the EIA release but after the experts have
19 Our

definition is different from that in Halova et al. (2014). The latter define a surprise as the difference between the actual

value and the median forecast, while we define the surprise as a categorical variable which takes the value one in case of a
surprise and zero otherwise. In other words, while Halova et al. (2014) estimate the magnitude of the surprise we focus on
whether the announcement is a surprise or not.
20 If Monday is a Federal holiday, the reports are released on the Wednesday afternoon.

11

Number of announcements

10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
1

3

5

7

9

11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43 45 47 49 51 53
Week number
Nb of NoSUR

Nb of SUR

Figure 2
Number of 3σ surprises vs. no surprise by week-of-the-year
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Figure 3
Number of 3σ positive surprises vs. negative surprises by week-of-the-year
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7
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3
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10

SUR

NoSUR
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NoSUR

5.66%

7.55%

13.21%

86.79%

3

4

7

46

9.43%

15.09%

24.53%

75.47%

5

8

13

40

53

2008

5.88%

3.92%

9.80%

90.20%

3

2

5

46

11.76%

9.80%

21.57%

78.43%

6

5

11

40

51

2009

3.85%

3.85%

7.69%

92.31%

2

2

4

48

9.62%

7.69%

17.31%

82.69%

5

4

9

43

52

2010

7.69%

1.92%

9.62%

90.38%

4

1

5

47

13.46%

9.62%

23.08%

76.92%

7

5

12

40

52

2011

1.92%

7.69%

9.62%

90.38%

1

4

5

47

9.62%

11.54%

21.15%

78.85%

5

6

11

41

52

2012

7.69%

3.85%

11.54%

88.46%

4

2

6

46

15.38%

9.62%

25.00%

75.00%

8

5

13

39

52

2013

2.33%

11.63%

13.95%

86.05%

1

5

6

37

9.30%

16.28%

25.58%

74.42%

4

7

11

32

43

2014

5.47%

5.72%

11.19%

88.81%

22

23

45

357

11.69%

10.70%

22.39%

77.61%

47

43

90

312

402

Total

is in the range between the lowest and highest economists’ estimates, or not much over this range.

prise (NegSUR) as a forecasting error over -3 or -4 standard deviations. NoSUR refers to all the other cases where the actual inventory

Bloomberg survey. A positive surprise (PosSUR) is defined as a forecasting error over +3 or +4 standard deviations and a negative sur-

SUR refers to the actual inventory announcement being +/-3 or 4 standard deviations away from the median forecast of the weekly

The table shows the sample statistics for oil-inventory surprises (SUR) over the period February 7th 2007 to October 22nd 2014.

4σ

3σ

47

2007

No. of news items

Year

Summary statistics for U.S. oil-inventory surprises

Table 2

been interviewed by Bloomberg to carry out its survey. As such, the informational content of the
API report might affect the surprise or non-surprise characteristic of the EIA announcement the
next day. This may not very likely, as recent research (Ye and Karali (2016)) has found that the API
report has only little informational content.21 Note that, in addition, any informational content in
the API report would mean that some of the announcements that we categorize as surprises are in
fact not so, thereby having a marginal effect on our overall results.

3.2

WTI futures prices

Our price data are the transaction prices for the WTI futures (ticker: CL) quoted on the NYMEX –
part of the CME Group from 2008 onwards – for the period covering all the announcements. Futures contracts used to be traded both on the electronic market – electronic trading began in July
2006 –, through CME Globex and ClearPort, and via an open outcry session.22 The open outcry
session used to cover the 9:00 a.m. – 2:30 p.m. period from Monday to Friday, while the electronic
market was open 6:00 p.m. – 5:00 p.m. from Sunday to Friday. All WTI futures contracts are quoted
in U.S. dollars per barrel, and the contract unit is 1,000 barrels with a delivery point at Cushing,
Oklahoma.23
We choose WTI futures for two reasons. First, WTI futures continue to be the world benchmark for
crude oil (Elder et al. (2014)), although this status has been called into question by recent research
21 This

finding is supported by oil-market practitioners who are doubtful about the value added of the API survey. In

Bloomberg (2013), the chief market strategist at Confluence Investment Management in St. Louis says: "You can go to
jail if you don’t contribute to the DOE and if you contribute bad numbers they can sue you. The API asks its members
to contribute. The members sometimes don’t, and sometimes they give the API incomplete numbers." The article further
mention that "Valero Energy Corp., the San Antonio-based biggest independent refiner in the U.S., is not a member of the
API and doesn’t participate in the weekly survey. Valero produced 910,000 barrels a day of distillate fuel, including heating
oil and diesel, in the second quarter [2013], according to the company’s earnings release. That’s about 20 percent of the 4.66
million barrel a day U.S. output reported by the EIA".
open outcry session ceased on July 7th 2015, which was considered to be a disappointing change by historical traders

22 The

(Financial Times (2015)).
specifications

23 Further

on

WTI

futures

contracts

can

be

found

on

the

CME

http://www.cmegroup.com/trading/energy/crude-oil/light-sweet-crude_contractSpecs_futures.html.
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website

at:

using high-frequency (intraday) data (see Liu et al. (2015) and the references therein). Second,
together with Brent traded on the ICE, the WTI today is the world’s most liquid crude oil contract
(both contracts trade around 150 million units a year) and was twice as liquid as the ICE-Brent
over the 2007-2014 period (see Halova Wolfe and Rosenman (2014)). This is also the most-traded
commodity future over the world in value. This liquidity is also visible in the number of daily transactions. Over our analysis period, the daily number of transactions on the front-month contract is
about 90,000, ensuring reasonable liquidity at all times of the day.24 As such, WTI futures should
attract informed traders who are strongly incited to trade in deep markets to limit the price impact
of their orders – if the transaction has a significant impact on the market price, the informational
advantage could be unprofitable – and to enjoy low transaction costs. We then consider WTI futures for their liquidity and the ability of most traders to hold positions at competitive cost in this
market.
As is common for the analysis of the futures prices of a given commodity, we use a continuous
series of futures prices by considering the front-month futures contract and switching to the next
front-month contract once the latter’s trading volume exceeds the former. As such, we are certain
to look at the most liquid WTI contract available for trading in the market at every point in time.
In addition, the front-month contract should be the quickest to reflect available information and
to react to new information, thereby being the most desired way in which informed traders can
benefit from private information.
To gauge liquidity in days with announcements, Figure 4 plots the volume for days with no surprise
(top panel), days with positive surprises (middle panel) and days with negative surprises (bottom
panel). This Figure shows the average number of contracts traded in 5-minute intervals during the
day. All three panels reveal the same pattern: a notable rise in trading activity at around 8:30, a
larger one at 9:00 (corresponding to the opening of the open outcry session), then a huge spike at
24 850,000 WTI futures and options of all maturities are traded daily.
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The total open interest is over 3 billions barrels.
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Figure 4
Volume (number of contracts) by 5-minute interval.

the time of the news release and slowly-decreasing trading activity ending with a last period of relatively intense trading corresponding to the final minutes of open outcry.25 The huge number of
traded contracts at the time of the announcement shows the importance of the EIA release in resolving the uncertainty surrounding the inventory level. We can also see from Figure 4 that volume
is, on average, higher on days with surprises, as market participants trade in response to the new
inventory level that has just been released to adjust their positions.
25 For

days with no announcement, the volume pattern is similar to that found in the literature on market microstructure, i.e.

higher trading volume at the start and end of the trading session and a U-shaped relationship between the start and end,
consistent with Admati and Pfleiderer (1988).
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3.3

The return pattern around announcements

Our first analysis of the data focuses on the return patterns of WTI futures series in days with inventory announcements. Figure 5 plots the average cumulative returns from 6:30 a.m. to 2:30 p.m.,
distinguishing between days with no surprise, days with a 3σ positive surprise and days with a 3σ
negative surprise. A number of comments can be made. First, there is no particular pattern in days
with no surprise, except for a small fall in price at the time of the announcement and during the two
hours before the announcement. This can be explained by our definition of a surprise, which is not
perfect by nature. An inventory level in line with expectations may surprise market participants
whose forecasts are different from the consensus. The negative reaction of the oil-futures price in
no-surprise days is due to an asymmetric feature that we will elaborate on below: the impact of
positive surprises is much larger, on average, than that of negative surprises.
Second, in days with positive surprises we observe a clear run-up in returns starting at around 8:30
a.m., i.e. two hours before the official release of the EIA inventory level. The pattern is then similar
to that in Hendershott et al. (2015) and Bernile et al. (2016), who also find increasing cumulative
returns ahead of news. At the time of the announcement, this anticipation leads to an average fall
in returns of 0.25%, which is to be compared with the 0.05% figure in Bernile et al. (2016) before the
FOMC announcement.26 Our result is in line with Ye and Karali (2016), who also identify large price
variations around surprising announcements.
Third, days with positive surprises are characterized by a large average price drop of about 0.5% –
traders take short positions as inventories are larger than expected – which is partly corrected in
the hours following the news release. Four hours later, the drop is half as large, i.e. 0.25%. In other
words, the futures price over-reacts to the announcement. Over-reaction is the subject of intense
research in behavioral finance. Recent contributions have attributed over-reactions to the general
26 Note, in addition, that our data include 43 positive surprises over a seven and a half year period, while the sample in Bernile

et al. (2016) includes only 25 surprises over the period September 1997 – June 2013, i.e. about 15 years. This highlights the
potential profit for insider trading around EIA news in the oil-futures market.
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sentiment in financial markets, while earlier work argued for over-confidence, positive feedback
trading or herding.27 In our context, over-reaction may be viewed as an efficient inefficiency (Pedersen (2015)), as it is not clear how it could be robustly exploited for trading purposes.
Fourth, days with negative surprises do not show any particular pattern in the pre-announcement
period. At the time of the news release, we then observe a positive jump – inventories are lower
than expected – which effect is much smaller in size than its counterpart for positive surprises.
Specifically, the average rise is about 0.15%, which is three times smaller than that when inventories
larger than expected. Negative surprises seem to have then only a limited impact on oil-futures
prices. Again, there is an over-reaction in the hours following the announcement, as for positive
surprises, with the initial price jump being absorbed by, on average, 2:30 p.m., i.e. at the end of the
open outcry session.
Overall, it is clear that, i) for positive surprises, there is a significant run-up from 8:30, ii) prices
respond to surprises, meaning that news really is news and is not common knowledge, and iii)
price over-reacts to surprises.

4

Empirical analysis

This section first presents the order-imbalance method and then the empirical results and robustness analysis with respect to alternative definitions of surprises.

4.1

Empirical Method

To see whether there is trading based on private information regarding the EIA inventory announcement, we consider trading activity in the futures market in the hours before the news release. Assuming that informed traders need immediate execution to exploit their informational advantage,
27 We

refer the interested reader to the survey in Barberis and Thaler (2003) for an exposition of the existing literature on,

among other phenomena, over-reaction. This interesting issue is beyond the scope of the present paper.
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Cumulative returns in announcement days.

19

we imagine that they will trade at the best price offered by their counterparts. It is then common to
measure informed trading by order imbalance OI, defined as:

OI = (B − S)/(B + S)

where B is the volume of buyer-initiated trading and S the volume of seller-initiated trading over
a given period of time. Volume can either be defined as the number of trades or the dollar trading
volume, producing OIN and OID respectively. When there is considerable variability in order size,
it is better to work with OID so as not to overweight small trades. Our baseline analysis will use
OID.28 The presence of informed trading will be revealed in OI that are significantly higher on days
of surprises. Large order imbalance is a strong indication, although not a formal proof, of trading
based on private information.
Our data for the WTI futures price do not indicate whether the transaction arises from a buyer or a
seller. As is common for such data, we rely on the tick rule to classify transactions as buyer or sellerinitiated. When the transaction price is above [below] the previous transaction price, we consider
the transaction as being buyer [seller] -initiated.29 One issue with our data is that they are stamped
only to the second, meaning that several transactions can occur in one second. We follow Bernile
et al. (2016) in calculating the volume-weighted price for the second of interest, and then rely on
the tick rule to classify the bulk of transactions in this second.
28 We

have replicated the full empirical analysis using OIN as the measure of informed trading. The results, similar to those

using OID, are not reported here but are available on the author’s website (https://sites.google.com/site/benoitsevi/).
et al. (2016) explain the use of the tick rule in the context of the literature on empirical market microstructure. We

29 Bernile

refer the interested reader to their footnote 11 for further explanations.
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4.2

Main findings

Figures 6 and 7 plot the OID computed over short intervals of 2 and 5 minutes, respectively, for
the periods two and a half hours before and after a typical announcement.30 In the top panel, we
plot the OID for days with announcements the value of which was in line with expert expectations.
In the middle and the bottom panel, we analagously plot the 2 and 5-minute OID for positive and
negative surprises, respectively.
On days without surprises, OIDs are small over the whole period, with no particular pattern. In contrast, on days with surprises, either positive or negative, we observe large OIDs immediately after
the announcement. This finding confirms our conclusion from the observation of the cumulative
returns (Figure 5) that news release has a large impact on the oil-futures price when the inventory
level is different from the expected value. Note that these large OIDs are particularly relevant in
light of the huge trading volume (B+S) in the oil-futures market every Wednesday at 10:30 a.m. (see
Figure 4). Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) set out a theory explaining the clusters in trades during
the trading session. This concentration of trading comes from the strategic behavior of liquidity
and informed traders who have incentives to trade at the same time. The spike in trading volume
at the time of announcement, either for surprises or not, is also consistent with the search for the
resolution of uncertainty. In summary, the news release is an event for the oil market, and market
participants trade heavily to adjust their positions at the time the inventory level is made public.
For negative surprises (the bottom panels), the OIDs are much larger than for days with no surprise, but appear largely random: we cannot identify any particular pattern either in the pre- or the
post-announcement periods. Conversely, in days with positive surprises, we observe OIDs that are
mostly in line with the subsequent announcement surprise (buyer-initiated orders). In particular,
in the 8:30 – 9:30 range, there are almost no positive OIDs, which is indicative of trading on private
30 We

have also calculated OIDs for one and ten-minute intervals and obtain similar patterns. Extending the analysis period

also produces similar results.
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information. Overall, the order-imbalance pattern is very consistent with the returns patterns plotted in Figure 5. We also conclude that the order imbalance somewhat predicts the content of the
news to be delivered.
During the post-announcement period, while OIDs are small in days with no surprises, we observe
the opposite pattern for days with positive and negative surprises. In the former case, the OIDs
appear to be mainly positive – buyer-initiated transactions – which is in line with the over-reaction
suggested in Figure 5. Similarly, OIDs are mostly negative – seller-initiated transactions – when
there are negative surprises, which is also consistent with over-reaction. It should be noted, however, that large OIDs are partly due to lower liquidity – small (B + S) – in the post-announcements
periods, as emphasized in Figure 4.

4.3

Statistical significance

To gauge the statistical significance of the patterns in Figures 6 and 7, we run the following regression:

OIt = α + β.I(SU R > 0) + γ.I(SU R < 0) + εt

We here regress the OID over a given time interval on two indicator variables: the first for positive
surprises and the second for negative surprises. We expect the OIDs to be significantly related to
the indicator variables, at least in the case of positive surprises. The coefficient estimates appear in
Table 3. Estimation is by ordinary least squares.31
The results clearly indicate a significant association between the dummy for positive surprises and
the average OID over the 8:30 – 9:30 period. The t-statistic is large (3.154), revealing the existence
31 In

preliminary work, we ran regressions with a dummy variable for days with an announcement, as in Bernile et al. (2016).

This did not attract a significant estimated coefficient. We thus only report results for the surprise dummies. The extended
results, which are qualitatively similar to those presented here, are available upon request.
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Figure 6
Order imbalance based on number of trades considering 3σ surprises (2 minutes).

of buyer-initiated orders before the public release of inventory levels that are higher than expected.
For the extended period 8:30 – 10:29, the relationship between the dummy and OID also appears,
but is less significant. When we extend the period over which the OID is calculated, we lose significance. In particular, the OID during the 4-hour pre-announcement period is not significantly
linked with surprises. Similarly, considering the last hour before the news release only does not
lead to significant estimates for the indicator variables. As such, we conclude that order imbalance
is concentrated in the hour surrounding the opening of the open outcry session.
One important feature of our results is the asymmetry between positive and negative surprises.
While we obtain statistically-significant estimates for inventories that are higher than expected,
the estimates for lower than expected inventories reveal no abnormal order imbalance for any subperiod of the pre-announcement period. The question then arises as to whether there is more order
imbalance in case of positive surprises. We suggest that informed traders in the oil-futures market
face different situations when expecting good or bad news. In the case of good news, participants
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Order imbalance based on number of trades considering 3σ surprises (5 minutes).

Table 3
Ordinary least squares estimates for 3σ surprises

Event windows
[−240, −120]

[−240, 0]

[−120, −60]

[−120, 0]

[−60, 0]

Intercept

PosSUR

NegSUR

-0.639

0.630

0.135

-1.412

0.469

0.105

-0.438

-0.568

0.300

-1.747

-0.767

0.420

0.212

-3.529

-0.009

0.522

-3.154

-0.008

-0.221

-1.758

0.389

-0.820

-2.304

0.588

-0.628

0.433

0.717

-1.886

0.458

0.778
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speculating on price drops and owning the commodity at the same time are naturally hedged. Conversely, when bad news is anticipated and the oil-futures prices is expected to increase, speculation
is more risky as hedging is not feasible.

4.4

Robustness analysis

We consider a number of alternative definitions of surprises. We also considered surprises defined
as in Bernile et al. (2016) and Ye and Karali (2016). These definitions are more sophisticated, as they
involve preliminary regressions, but their use does not change our results. These methods end up
identifying the same surprises as our simple definition used throughout the paper. Another surprise definition is that in Andersen et al. (2003), which is (Actt − F ort )/σbt where Actt is the released
value, F ort the predicted value and σbt the sample standard deviation of the surprise component
Actt − F ort over the past 100 weeks. We have also experimented with surprises defined as realized
values outside the range of forecasts. The results are again very similar to those in our baseline
analysis.
To save space, we here only present the results when the surprise is defined as actual values that are
over four standard deviations from the median forecast: these are coined 4σ surprises. The number
of surprises drops by about a half, as can be seen in the bottom panel of Table 2. Again, we do not
identify any specific pattern over the years. The number of surprises by year is between 4 and 7. We
end up with a total of 23 positive surprises and 22 negative surprises over the period of interest.
The order imbalance for 2-minute intervals is plotted in Figure 8, and is quite similar to that for 3σ
surprises. There is order imbalance in the selling direction for positive surprises in the 8:30 – 9:30
period. We also note a cluster of notable buyer-initiated orders around 9:00 in days with negative
surprises.
The estimates for the regression using 4σ surprises appear in Table 4. The results are qualitatively
similar to those in Table 3, where surprises are defined less strictly. The t-statitics are, however,
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Order imbalance based on number of trades and 4σ surprises (2 minutes).

Table 4
Regression analysis of order-imbalance measures for 4σ surprises

Event windows
[−240, −120]

[−240, 0]

[−120, −60]

[−120, 0]

[−60, 0]

Intercept

PosSUR

NegSUR

-0.592

1.519

-0.694

-1.413

0.951

-0.298

-0.446

-0.116

-0.278

-1.891

-0.126

-0.244

0.060

-3.633

-0.372

0.158

-2.441

-0.272

-0.270

-1.956

-0.118

-1.063

-2.103

-0.152

-0.500

-0.350

-0.415

-1.600

-0.278

-0.376
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lower. This could reflect the smaller number of surprises. Moreover, we fail to identify any significant relationship between OID and negative surprises, possibly due to the smaller number (22) of
negative surprises.

5

Conclusion

This paper has provided evidence of a clear run-up price effect of about 0.25% and large sellinginitiated transactions ahead of the EIA-DOE inventory release each Wednesday, when the level to
be released is higher than expected. The significant order imbalance takes place around the opening of the open outcry session, when increasing liquidity facilitates discreet trading. Our results,
derived from high-frequency data, are robust to alternative definitions of surprises and are consistent with potentially informed trading. However, we are not able to formally conclude that private
information is used by insiders, as our data does not allow us to identify the channel by which this
information would enter the market.
Our analysis has a number of implications with respect to the Weekly Petroleum Status Report.
First, it raises the question of whether EIA lock-up practices are really secure. This calls into question the overall security of raised recently in numerous media (Wall Street Journal (2013, 2016)).
Second, our work also has regulatory implications, as we might wish for the better monitoring of
oil markets around announcements to better assess the presence of insider trading. Third, the time
chosen for the announcement could also be changed to limit the potential for insider trading in
times of high liquidity. For instance, an announcement at 8:30 a.m. might help to moderate the
activity of insiders in the oil0-futures market in the pre-announcement period.
One limit of our work, which also is a possible avenue for future research, lies in the transactions
that we cannot relate to traders. The use of data with the type of traders, or possibly their identity, at
the tick-data level would reveal new features. Existing work such as Phillips and Weiner (1994) uses
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trade-level data to gauge the profit for various types of traders in the North Sea oil forward market.
Using individual trade data, the authors are able to identify the types of traders that make profits,
and so test the theory of insurance or information in forward trading. In the same vein, Ederington
and Lee (2002) use CFTC-type data on traders’ positions in the heating-oil futures market to gauge
the hedging and speculative behavior of various agents. Both contributions have valuable data on
trades, making their analysis innovative with respect to trader behavior in oil markets. However,
they do not investigate the response of prices and/or volume to news.
Other potential lines of research include the analysis of informed trading for alternative oil-related
assets such as options on futures, stocks of oil companies or the FX rates of oil-exporting countries.
We have also not exploited the apparent over-reaction to news. In the vein of papers dealing with
short-term contrarian strategies based on news, the economic value of these patterns could then
be estimated.
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Büyükşahin, B., Harris, J.H., 2011. Do Speculators Drive Crude Oil Futures Prices? The Energy Journal 32, 167-202.
Chang, C., Daouk, H., Wang, A., 2009. Do investors learn about analyst accuracy? A study of the oil futures market.
Journal of Futures Markets 29, 414-429.
Chatrath, A., Miao, H., Ramchander, S., 2012. Does the price of crude oil respond to macroeconomic news? Journal
of Futures Markets 32, 536-559.
Chiou-Wei, S.-Z., Linn, S.C., Zhu, Z., 2014. The response of U.S. natural gas futures and spot prices to storage
change surprises: Fundamental information and the effect of escalating physical gas production. Journal of
International Money and Finance 42, 156-173.
Christophe, S.E., Ferri, M.G., Hsieh, J., 2010. Informed trading before analyst downgrades: Evidence from short
sellers. Journal of Financial Economics 95, 85–106.
Datta, D.D., Londono, J.M., Ross, L.J., 2014. Generating options-implied probability densities to understand oil
market events. International Finance Discussion Papers no. 1122, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System.
Deaton, A., Laroque, G., 1996. Competitive storage and commodity price dynamics. Journal of Political Economy
104, 896-923.
Ederington, L.H., Fernando, C.S., Lee, T.K., Linn, S.C., May, A.D., 2011. Factors influencing oil prices: A survey of the
current state of knowledge in the context of the 2007-08 oil price volatility. Working Paper, Energy Information
Administration, Department of Energy, Washington, DC.
Ederington, L.H., Lee, J.H., 1993. How markets process information: News releases and volatility. Journal of Finance 48, 1161-1191.
Ederington, L.H., Lee, J.H., 1995. The short-run dynamics of the price adjustment to new information. Journal of
Financial and Quantitative Analysis 30, 117-134.
Ederington, L.H., Lee, J.H., 2002. Who trades futures and how: Evidence from the heating oil futures market.
Journal of Business 75, 353-373.
Elder, J., Miao, H., Ramchander, S., 2013. Jumps in oil prices: The role of economic news. The Energy Journal 34,
217-237.
Elder, J., Miao, H., Ramchander, S., 2014. Price discovery in crude oil futures. Energy Economics 46, S18-S27.
Fattouh, B., Kilian, L., Mahadeva, L., 2013. The role of speculation in oil markets: what have we learned so far? The
Energy Journal 34, 7-33.
Ferraro, D., Rogoff, K., Rossi, B., 2015. Can oil prices forecast exchange rates? An empirical analysis of the relationship between commodity prices and exchange rates. Journal of International Money and Finance 54, 116-141.

30

Financial Times, 2015. Pits stop: Electronic markets herald the last hurrah for oil futures trading pits. July 7.
Fishe, R.P.H., Robe, M.A., 2004. The impact of illegal insider trading in dealer and specialist markets: Evidence from
a natural experiment. Journal of Financial Economics 71, 461–488.
Futures Magazine, 2010. CFTC proposes Eddie Murphy rule, April 1, C. Birkner.
Geman, H., Nguyen, V.-N., 2005. Soybean inventory and forward curve dynamics. Management Science 51, 10761091.
Grossman, S.J., 1986. An analysis of the role of "insider trading" on futures markets. Journal of Business 59, S129S146.
Hamilton, J.D., 2009a. Causes and consequences of the oil shock of 2007-2008. Brookings Papers on Economic
Activity, Spring 2009, 215-259.
Hamilton, J.D., 2009b. Understanding crude oil prices. The Energy Journal 30, 179-206.
Halova, M.W., Kurov, A., Kucher, O., 2014. Noisy inventory announcements and energy prices. Journal of Futures
Markets 34, 911–933.
Halova Wolfe, M.W., Rosenman, R., 2014. Bidirectional causality in oil and gas markets. Energy Economics 42,
325–331.
Hendershott, T., Livdan, D., Schürhoff, N., 2015. Are institutions informed about news? Journal of Financial Economics 117, 249-287.
Hirshleifer, D., Subrahmanyam, A., Titman, S., 1994. Security analysis and trading patterns when some investors
receive information before others. Journal of Finance 49, 1665-1698.
Irvine, P., Lipson, M., Puckett, A., 2007. Tipping. Review of Financial Studies 20, 741-768 .
Jarrell, G.A., Poulsen, A.B., 1989. Stock trading before announcement of tender offers: Insider trading or market
anticipation. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 5, 225-248.
John, K., Lang, L.H.P., 1991. Insider trading around dividend announcements: Theory and evidence. Journal of
Finance 46, 1361–1389.
Jones, C.M., Kaul, G., 1996. Oil and the stock markets. Journal of Finance 51, 463–491.
Kilian, L., Lee, T.K., 2014. Quantifying the speculative component in the real price of oil: The role of global oil
inventories. Journal of International Money and Finance 42, 71-87.
Kilian, L., Murphy, D.P., 2014. The role of inventories and speculative trading in the global market for crude oil.
Journal of Applied Econometrics 29, 454-478.
Kilian, L., Park, C., 2009. The impact of oil price shocks on the U.S. stock market. International Economic Review
50, 1267–1287.
Kilian, L., Vega, C., 2011. Do energy prices respond to U.S. macroeconomic news? A test of the hypothesis of

31

predetermined energy prices. Review of Economics and Statistics 93, 660-671.
Knittel, C.R., Pindyck, R.S., 2016. The simple economics of commodity price speculation. American Economic
Journal: Macroeconomics 8, 85-110.
Lehecka, G.V., Wang, X., Garcia, P., 2014. Gone in ten minutes: Intraday evidence of announcement effects in the
electronic corn futures market. Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy 36, 504–526.
Leland, H.E., 1992. Insider trading: Should it be prohibited? Journal of Political Economy 100, 859-887.
Linn, S.C., Zhu, Z., 2004. Natural gas prices and the gas storage report: Public news and volatility in energy futures
markets. Journal of Futures Markets 24, 283–313.
Liu, W.-M., Schultz, E., Swieringa, J., 2015. Price dynamics in global crude oil markets. Journal of Futures Markets
35, 148-162.
Lucca, D.O., Moench, E., 2015. The pre-FOMC announcement drift. Journal of Finance 70, 329–371.
Michaelides, A., Milidonis, A., Nishiotis, G.P., Papakyriakou, P., 2015. The adverse effects of systematic leakage
ahead of official sovereign debt rating announcements. Journal of Financial Economics 116, 526-547.
Pedersen, L.H., 2015. Efficiently inefficient. Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford.
Pettit, R.R., 1972. Dividend announcements, security performance and capital market efficiency. Journal of Finance 27, 993-1007.
Phillips, G.M., Weiner, R.J., 1994. Information and normal backwardation as determinants of trading performance:
Evidence from the North Sea oil forward market. Economic Journal 104, 76–95.
Pindyck, R.S., 1994. Inventories and short run dynamics of commodity prices. RAND Journal of Economics 25,
141-159.
Pindyck, R.S., 2001. The dynamics of commodity spot and futures markets: A primer. The Energy Journal 22, 1-29.
Pindyck, R.S., 2004. Volatility and commodity price dynamics. Journal of Futures Markets 24, 1029-1047.
Pirrong, C. 2009. Stochastic fundamental volatility, speculation, and commodity storage. Technical report, University of Houston, Houston.
Raman, V., Robe, M.A., Yadav, P.K., 2016. Financialization, intraday institutional trading, and commodity market
quality. University of Warwick working paper.
Reeb, D.M., Zhang, Y., Zhao, W., 2014. Insider trading in supervised industries. Journal of Law and Economics 57,
529–559.
Rogers, J.L., Skinner, D.J., Zechman, S.L.C., 2016. Run EDGAR Run: SEC Dissemination in a High-Frequency World.
Chicago Booth Working Paper, 14-36.
Rosa, C., 2014. The high-frequency response of energy prices to U.S. monetary policy: Understanding the empirical
evidence. Energy Economics 45, 295–303.

32

Singleton, K.J., 2014. Investor flows and the 2008 boom/bust in oil prices. Management Science 60, 300-318.
Smith, J.L., Thompson, R., Lee, T.K., 2015. The informational role of spot prices and inventories. Journal of Energy
Markets 8, 95-121.
Verstein, A., 2016. Insider Trading in Commodities Markets. Virginia Law Review 102, 447-500.
Wall Street Journal, 2013. FBI Finds Black Boxes that Control Government Data are Vulnerable, August 5, B. Mullins
and D. Barrett.
Wall Street Journal, 2015. Oil Turns Up, With 5.6% Gain. January 15. By N. Friedman.
Wall Street Journal, 2016. Fed Officials Concerned about Use of Insider Information as Early as 2010, January 15, J.
Zumbrun.
Wall Street Journal Online, 2015. You Can Blame Oil Data for Stock Volatility. February 4. By D. Strumpf. See web
link: http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2015/02/04/you-can-blame-oil-data-for-stock-volatility/
Wilmot, N.A., Mason, C.F., 2013. Jump processes in the market for crude oil. The Energy Journal 34, 33-48.
Ye, S., Karali, B., 2016. The informational content of inventory announcements: Intraday evidence from crude oil
futures market. Energy Economics 59, 349-364.
Zhang, H.J., Dufour, J.-M., Galbraith, J.W., 2016. Exchange rates and commodity prices: Measuring causality at
multiple horizons. Journal of Empirical Finance 36, 100-120.

33

İ
İ

ş
ş

Ś

č

ěř

